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PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AS
SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE: ILLINOIS TAKES THE
STING OUT OF THE TURNCOAT WITNESS
"State's witness changes story" is a headline that seems to appear frequently in our nation's tabloids. If the prosecution is relying
on a witness' testimony to satisfy a crucial element of the state's
case and the witness testifies adversely or inconsistently, the state's
proof will fail unless the prosecution can get the witness' prior inconsistent statement' admitted as substantive evidence.2 This situation involving a "turncoat witness ' ' is every prosecutor's recurring
nightmare. In many states,' the prosecution may not introduce the
prior inconsistent statement substantively; its use is restricted to
impeaching the credibility of the witness.' However, this restrictive
1. A prior inconsistent statement, as its name implies, is a witness' statement
made at a time before the present trial or hearing that is materially different from his
present testimony. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1018

(Chadbourn rev. 1970); New Jersey Developments, Rule of Evidence 63(l)(a): A Proposed Redraft of New Jersey's Much-Amended Rule on Prior Inconsistent Statements, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 777, 777 (1982).
2. Substantive evidence is "[t]hat adduced for the purpose of proving a fact in
issue, as opposed to evidence given for the purpose of discrediting a witness, or of
corroborating his testimony." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (5th ed. 1979).
When a statement is admitted substantively, the jury may consider it in determining guilt or innocence. However, admissibility must be distinguished from sufficiency. That a statement is substantively admissible does not guarantee that it will be
sufficient to satisfy the proponent's burden of proof. Stalmack, Prior Inconsistent
Statements: Congress Takes a Compromising Step Backwards in Enacting Rule
801 (d) (1)(A), 8 Lov U. CHI. L. J. 251, 267-69 (1977). If the statement satisfies a crucial
element of the state's case, its substantive admissibility will allow the state to avoid a
directed verdict of acquittal, but the state's proof may not be sufficient to sustain a
verdict of guilty. Peeples, Prior Inconsistent Statements and the Rule Against Impeachment of One's Own Witness: The Proposed FederalRules, 52 TEx L. REV. 1383,
1389 n.27 (1974).
3. The phrase "turncoat witness" appears to have been coined by Professor McCormick in his seminal article on the subject. McCormick, The Turncoat Witness:
Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEx. L. REV. 573 (1947). There are
many reasons why a witness might turn coat. The witness may have been bribed,
coerced, persuaded, may be lying for reasons unknown, or may have merely concluded
that his prior statement was misguided. Id. at 575.
4. There are currently 17 states that still follow the so-called orthodox rule:
Alabama, Connecticut, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE I 801(d)(1)(A) [09] (1984) and Annot., 30 A.L.R. 4th 414
(1983) for their compilations of the various states' positions.
5. Generally, impeachment is a process whereby a party seeks to discredit a
witness in the eyes of the trier of fact. "Impeachment by prior inconsistent statement
seeks to prove that the witness either spoke in error or deliberately falsified one of
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theory, termed the "orthodox view, ' is quickly becoming disfavored. A growing number of states, following the prompting of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, have adopted provisions allowing some
degree of substantive use of prior inconsistent statements.7 On July
1, 1984, Illinois became the latest state to join this growing trend.8
Ever since the Federal Rules of Evidence were proposed, a constant debate has been waged over the propriety of using prior inconsistent statements substantively.9 This debate has spawned many
the two statements." Graham, Prior Inconsistent Statements-Impeachment and
Substantive Admissibility: An Analysis of the Effect of Adopting the Proposed Illinois Rules of Evidence, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 329, 330.
6. The term "orthodox rule," seems to have been fashioned by Dean Wigmore
in the first edition of his treatise. The term refers to the common law doctrine relating to prior inconsistent statements which dates back to the origin of our Union. 3A J.
WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 996 (cases cited therein date back to the early 1800's).
7. The number of states that have either judicially or legislatively adopted rules
allowing prior inconsistent statements to be used as substantive evidence has increased dramatically in recent years. Today, 33 states allow some form of substantive
use. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) has been followed in 12 states. The Federal Rules of Evidence are codified at 28 U.S.C. (1982) (adopted 1975). See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 90.801(2)(a) (West 1979); IOWA R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); ME. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(A); MINN. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(a); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-801(4)(a)(i) (1979);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2801(4)(a)(1) (West 1980); ORE. R. EvID. 801(4)(a)(A); S.D.
R. EvID. § 19-16-2(1); TEx. R. EvIn. 801(e)(1)(A); VT. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A); WASH. R.
EVID. 801(d)(1)(i); Wyo. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) (limited to criminal proceedings only).
See also infra note 15 for the text of rule 801(d)(1)(A).
In 12 states, the rule provides for substantive admissibility of a prior inconsistent
statement if the witness is in court and subject to cross-examination, without regard
to whether the prior statement was made under oath. See Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga.
858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982); Watkins v. State, 446 N.E.2d 949 (Ind. 1983); State v.
Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103 (1983);
ALASKA R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A); ARIZ. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(A); CAL. EVID. CODE. § 1235
(West 1966); COLO. R. EvIn. 801(d)(1)(A); DEL. UNIF. R. EvID. 801(d)(1); MONT. R.
EvID. 801(d)(1)(A); NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.035(2)(a) (1979); N.M. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 908.01(4)(a)(1) (West 1975).
Finally, nine states, including Illinois, have adopted compromise positions that
allow prior inconsistent statements to be admitted as substantive evidence in certain
circumstances. These positions are either more or less stringent than rule
801(d)(1)(A), but they do not allow all prior inconsistent statements to be admitted.
See State v. Garnes, 229 Kan. 368, 624 P.2d 448 (1981); Nugent v. Commonwealth,
639 S.W.2d 761 (Ky. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (1979); HAWAII R. EVID.
802.1(1); N.J. R. Evm. 63(1)(a); N.D. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A); OHIO R. EvID. 801(D)(1)(a);
UTAH R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A).
The variety of provisions that have been adopted run the gamut as to the limitations placed upon admissibility. Compare OHIO R. EVID. 801(D)(1)(a) (very limited
admissibility) with ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (1979) (parallels federal rule in criminal
cases, and admits all prior inconsistent statements in civil cases) and N.D. R. EvID.
801(d)(1)(A) (same) and UTAH R, EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) (very broad provision).
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1 (Supp. 1984). For the complete text of the
new rule, see infra text accompanying note 79. Cf. HAWAII R. EVID. 802.1(1) (state
rule most similar to the Illinois rule).
9. The debate over the use of prior inconsistent statements actually predates
the proposal for Federal Rules of Evidence. See McCormick, supra note 3, at 577.
Compare State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939) (supporting orthodox
rule) with United States v. Rainwater, 283 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1959) (criticizes orthodox rule). When the Federal Rules of Evidence were proposed, however, the debate
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conflicting theories.' 0 At one extreme are those who advocate substantive admission of all prior inconsistent statements," provided
the witness is present at trial 2 and subject to cross-examination.13
At the other extreme are those commentators who are still content
with the orthodox rule.' Compromise positions have been taken between the two extremes, two examples of which are Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(1)(A)' 5 and the newly enacted Illinois rule.'
The new Illinois rule differs substantially from any existing
statutory approach. The rule attempts to alleviate the constraints of
the orthodox rule by allowing the substantive admission of certain
was intensified.
10. See generally Graham, supra note 5 (an objective analysis of a rule similar
to the federal rule); Graham, The Relationship Among Federal Rules of Evidence
607, 801(d)(1)(A), and 403: A Reply to Weinstein's Evidence, 55 TEx. L. REV. 573
(1977) (criticizes use of Federal Rule 403 as a curb on rule 801(d)(1)(A)); Jeans, Evidentiary Effects and Tactical Options in the Use of Out of Court Statements, 47
UMKC L. REV. 145 (1978) (practical proposals for using prior inconsistent statements
at trial); Peeples, supra note 2 (supports proposed federal rules and suggests amendment to rule 607); Silbert, FederalRule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 49 TEMP. L. Q. 880
(1976) (analysis of proposed rules); Comment, Symposium on the Federal Rules of
Evidence: Their Effect on Wyoming Practice if Adopted, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV.
601 (1977) (overview of the federal rule).
11. See Ordover, Surprise! That Damaging Turncoat Witness is Still With Us:
An Analysis of Federal Rules of Evidence 607, 801(d)(1)(A) and 403, 5 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 65 (1976); Stalmack, supra note 2, at 251. See also Rules of Evidence for United
States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 293 (1972) (rule originally proposed by
the Advisory Committee sought to admit all prior inconsistent statements if witness
is subject to cross-examination).
12. Under even the most lenient rules for substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements, the witness must testify at the trial in which the statement is
sought to be admitted. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 996.
13. Aside from testifying at the present trial, the witness must be "subject to"
cross-examination concerning the statement. Id. See also infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
14. See Blakey, Moving Towards an Evidence Law of General Principles:Several Suggestions Concerning an Evidence Code for North Carolina, 13 N.C. CENT.
L.J. 1 (1981); Reutlinger, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Presently Inconsistent Doctrine, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 361 (1974); Comment, Hearsay, Witnesses' PriorStatements,
and Criminal Justice in Illinois, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 675.
15. Rule 801(d)(1)(A) provides:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay-A statement is not hearsay if(1) Prior Statement by Witness-The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the
statements is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a
deposition ....
R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A).

FED.

Some commentators have lent support to the federal rule. See, e.g., Gamble,
Howard & McElroy, The Turncoat or Chameleonic Witness: Use of His PriorInconsistent Statement, 34 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1983) (urges Alabama legislature to adopt federal rules); Perroni, Impeachment of One's Own Witness by Prior Inconsistent
Statements Under the Federal and Arkansas Rules of Evidence, 1 U. ARK. LITTLE
RocK L. J. 277 (1978) (advocates that Arkansas rule should be interpreted like federal
rule).
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1 (Supp. 1984).
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types of prior inconsistent statements." However, the efficacy of any
rule governing the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements
must be viewed against the goal of allowing the trier of fact to hear
as much relevant evidence as possible. This comment will present
the new Illinois rule, and analyze the rule's probable effect in light
of this goal."8 It will begin with a brief history of the treatment of
prior inconsistent statements, focusing on the rationale underlying
both the orthodox rule and the rules allowing substantive use. 9 Previous Illinois law involving prior, inconsistent statements will then be
outlined briefly.20 The comment will then examine the probable effect of the new rule and will conclude that although the Illinois rule
is a progressive step forward, there is no compelling reason why the
legislature should not go farther and admit all prior inconsistent
statements as substantive evidence, 21 provided the witness will be
subject to effective cross-examination.
THE CONTINUING DEBATE:

AN OVERVIEW

The orthodox rule, which limits the use of prior inconsistent
statements to impeachment purposes only, evolved because of the
perceived hearsay quality of these statements.2 2 Hearsay is defined
as an out of court statement used to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. 2 The hearsay rule excludes out of court statements because the jury cannot determine the credibility of the out of court
declarant at the time the assertion was made. 24 Because the definition of a prior inconsistent statement necessarily includes an out of
25
court statement, the orthodox rule forbids its use substantively.
Generally, an out of court statement, as opposed to present tes17. Id. The Illinois rule is more expansive than the federal rule, but does not
allow for the admission of all prior inconsistent statements. Compare the Illinois rule
with the authorities cited supra note 7.
18. See infra notes 77-136 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 22-59 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 60-76 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 137-69 and accompanying text.
22. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 251 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
See also State of Mississippi v. Durham, 444 F.2d 152, 156 (4th Cir. 1971) (hearsay
rule would be violated by substantive admission). The orthodox rule, therefore, must
be viewed in conjunction with the common law development of the hearsay rule in
the United States since the late 17th century. Id.
23. The term "out of court statement" refers to any assertion that was made
outside of the current judicial proceeding. Bein, PriorInconsistent Statements: The
Hearsay Rule, 801(d)(1)(A) and 803(24), 26 UCLA L. REV. 967, 984 (1979).
24. Id. See also People v. Carpenter, 28 Ill. 2d 116, 212, 190 N.E.2d 738, 741
(1963) ("Hearsay evidence is testimony in court or written evidence, of a statement
made out of court, such statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of
matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the outof-court asserter.").
25. M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.11 (1981).

19851

PriorInconsistent Statements

timony,2 6 suffers from three basic hearsay pitfalls. First, the out of
court statement is generally not made under oath.2 7 Second, the
trier of fact was not able to observe the demeanor of the witness
when he made the statement.2 Third, contemporaneous cross-examination of the witness was lacking when the statement was made.2
Each of these pitfalls adversely affects the jury's ability to determine the reliability and veracity of the witness. Supporters of the
orthodox rule claim that because prior inconsistent statements were
necessarily made outside of the current proceedings, they suffer
from all three pitfalls.3 0 The most emphasis, however, is placed on
the lack of contemporaneous cross-examination.$1 Advocates of the
orthodox rule argue that effective cross-examination can only occur
at the time the statement was made, so that "[i]ts strokes fall while
the iron is hot. '3 2 Moreover, orthodox rule advocates argue that
when the witness has recanted prior to trial, subsequent cross-examination is not an adequate substitute and has, in effect, lost all of its
efficacy.33
The first great judicial blow to the orthodox rule came from
Judge Learned Hand in DiCarlo v. United States. 4 In DiCarlo, a
woman testified in front of the grand jury that the defendants had
committed a crime.3 5 During direct examination at trial, however,
she recanted. The prosecution was then given wide latitude to crossexamine her, thereby eliciting many inconsistent statements.3 "
Judge Hand's opinion attacked the rationale of the orthodox rule
26. If the witness admits the truth of the extra-judicial statement while on the
stand in the present trial, the statement is no longer hearsay, but is present testimony and is admissible as direct evidence. Graham, Employing Inconsistent Statements for Impeachment and as Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review and Proposed Amendments of Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 613, and 607, 75
MicH. L. REV. 1565, 1592 n.75 (1977).
27. Reutlinger, supra note 14, at 362.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.; Stalmack, supra note 3, at 255.
31. Graham, supra note 26, at 1569. Professor Graham has summarized the position of orthodox supporters by posing the following question: "What is the value of
cross-examination that is not conducted contemporaneously with the making of the
statement whose truth is in question before the same trier of fact that must determine whether the statement is truthful?" Id.
32. State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 362, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (1939).
33. For example, supporters of the orthodox rule claim that lack of contemporaneous cross-examination allows a witness "time to crystallize and rationalize a false
story." Reutlinger, supra note 14, at 370. The emphasis placed upon contemporaneous cross-examination seems to rest upon the assumption that to be effective, crossexamination must take place in an adversarial atmosphere. Therefore, unless there is
an opportunity to break the witness down, cross-examination really has not occurred.
Id. at 371. See also Graham, supra note 26, at 1570.
34. 6 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1925).
35. Id. at 367.
36. Id. at 368.
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stating that "[tihere is no mythical necessity that the case must be
decided only in accordance with the truth of words uttered under
oath in court. ' '3 7 Judge Hand noted that the jury might accept the
prior statements for their truth but he found no difficulty with that
result. 8 Since then, courts"9 and scholars"0 have attacked the orthodox rule as an undue limitation to the truth seeking process."' Moreover, these commentators allege that all probative evidence should
be placed before the trier of fact in order to ascertain the truth.'
Advocates of the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements during trial, or what is termed the "modern view," reject the
claim that prior inconsistent statements suffer from the three hearsay pitfalls.'" First, the requirement of "oath" is considered to be of
little value in ensuring reliability. 4' Second, because the trier of fact
can currently observe the demeanor of the witness, nothing is lost
simply because the trier of fact was not present when the statement
was made.' 5 Finally, contemporaneous cross-examination is not necessary because cross-examination at the trial in which the witness is
46
testifying is both efficient and sufficient.
Supporters of the modern view also advance two other reasons
for the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements. First, the prior
statement is more reliable than the present in-court testimony because it was made closer in time to the event in question. 47 Second,
when a prior inconsistent statement is currently used to impeach a
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1964) (Judge
Friendly allowed substantive use prior to adoption of the federal rules); United States
v. Rainwater, 283 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1959) (criticizes the orthodox rule); State v. Skinner, 110 Ariz. 135, 515 P.2d 880 (1973) (judicially abolished orthodox rule); State v.
Igoe, 206 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1973) (same).
40. See 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 996; McCormick, supra note 3, at 57578. See also supra notes 10 & 11.
41. Stalmack, supra note 2, at 252.
42. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 801(d)(1)[01] (1984).
43. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 996. Because the witness is present and
subject to cross-examination, "[tihe whole purpose of the hearsay rule has been already satisfied." See also supra note 10.
44. Graham, supra note 26, at 1568. Even supporters of the orthodox rule discount the necessity of requiring the statement to have been made under oath.
Reutlinger, supra note 14, at 363-64.
45. Stalmack, supra note 2, at 259; Comment, Symposium on the FederalRules
of Evidence: Their Effect on Wyoming Practice if Adopted, 12 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 601, 650 (1977). "If, from all that the jury see of the witness, they conclude that
what he says now is not the truth, but what he said before, they are none the less
deciding from what they see and hear of that person and in court." DiCarlo v. United
States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1925).
46. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 996-97; McCormick, supra note 3, at 576.
See also infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
47. McCormick, supra note 3, at 577 ("memory hinges upon recency"). The
closer that the statement was made to the event in question, the less chance there is
for the witness to falsify his story. Reutlinger, supra note 14, at 368.
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witness, the jury is instructed to consider the statement only as it
relates to the witness' credibility, and not as proof of guilt or innocence.4 This type of instruction, however, is almost impossible for a
jury to follow.49 The jury will most likely ignore the instruction and
impart substantive value to the impeaching statement." Modern
view supporters, therefore, also argue that prior inconsistent statements should be admitted as substantive evidence to avoid confounding the jury.
In fashioning a rule governing prior inconsistent statements, a
legislative body must consider a number of factors, including the reliability"' of prior inconsistent statements, the efficacy of subsequent
cross-examination," and the desirability of placing as much evidence as possible before the trier of fact.5 3 Both Congress and various state legislatures have placed different values on each of these
factors. Three basic positions have been advanced. The first position
is the orthodox rule, which many states still follow." ' Another position, which could be called the "extreme modern view," encompasses the admissibility of all prior inconsistent statements when
the witness is subject to cross-examination.5 5 The third position,
that of Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A), 56 represents a compromise be48. For example, the Illinois instruction is:
3.11 Impeachment-Prior Inconsistent Statements
The believability of a witness may be challenged by evidence that on some
former occasion he [(made a statement) (acted in a manner)] that was not consistent with his testimony in this case. Evidence of this kind may be considered
by you only for the purpose of deciding the weight to be given the testimony
you heard from the witness in the courtroom.
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, ILLINOIS PATTERN

JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) 3.11 (1981).
49. Asaro v. Parisi, 297 F.2d 859, 864 (5th Cir.) (this type of instruction renders
orthodox rule unrealistic), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 904 (1962); People v. Paradise, 30 Ill.
2d 381, 384, 196 N.E.2d 689, 691 (1964)(it is likely that jury will impart substantive
weight to the statement notwithstanding the instruction); McCormick, supra note 3,
at 580.
50. Stalmack, supra note 2, at 266. Contra Peeples, supra note 2, at 1395-96
(conceding that the instruction is confusing, but that is no reason to abandon the
orthodox rule).
51. Prior statements, if considered hearsay, contain an inherent unreliability
which the hearsay rule seeks to prevent. The rule maker must determine how reliable
or unreliable prior inconsistent statements are as a class. Moreover, he should consider whether any of the arguments that orthodox rule supporters put forth have any
merit, namely, whether substantive use will lead to "unsavory practices in dealing
with witnesses," or whether the lack of contemporaneous cross-examination will lead
to unjust results. Bein, supra note 23, at 972-73.
52. Id.
53. The rule maker should also determine how important it is to present as

much evidence as is practicable to the trier of fact, and then determine what limitations, if any, should be placed upon the means chosen to achieve those ends. 4 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 42, at 801-124.
54. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 11.
56. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). The final, adopted version of this rule was the
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tween the two extremes. The federal rule allows substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements in limited situations. The
limitations are intended to ensure greater reliability and ensure that
the statement was actually made. 57
The new Illinois rule" also attempts to balance the rationales
underlying the two extreme positions. The Illinois rule attempts to
ensure reliability and the making of the statement, while expanding
admissibility beyond the situations contemplated in the federal
rule.59 Although the new rule does not allow for substantive use of
all prior inconsistent statements, it does represent a much needed
expansion over previous Illinois law.
PREVIOUS ILLINOIS LAW

Illinois had always been a consistent and rigid adherent to the
orthodox rule. 0 Prior inconsistent statements, therefore, had been
limited to impeachment use only.61 Illinois courts, however, went
one step further and developed a judicial rule which even limited
the use of prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes.6" This judicial limitation was termed the voucher rule. 3 This
result of a compromise between the House and Senate versions initially proposed. See
Stalmack, supra note 2, at 253-55 (criticizing the compromise position adopted).
57. See Stalmack, supra note 2, at 253-55. The House added the requirement
that the prior statement was made at a formal proceeding so that there would be no
doubt that the statement was actually made. The formal setting of a judicial proceeding was also thought to increase the reliability of the statement. Id.
58. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1 (Supp. 1984). The Illinois rule represents a
compromise between Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A) and the rules allowing substantive
admissibility of all prior inconsistent statements.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., People v. Marino, 44 Ill. 2d 562, 256 N.E.2d 770 (1970); Ritter v.
People, 130 11. 225, 22 N.E. 605 (1889); Moore v. People, 108 Ill. 484 (1884); Hapke v.
Brandon, 343 Ill. App. 524, 99 N.E.2d 636 (1951).
61. "Under the Illinois decisions a prior inconsistent statement is hearsay and
hence is not admitted as substantive evidence but rather is admitted solely for its
impeaching effect upon the credibility of the witness." M. GRAHAM, CLEARY & GRAHAM'S HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 801.9 (4th ed. 1984).

62. Use of a prior statement for impeachment purposes must first be predicated
upon a finding of inconsistency. Id. § 613.2. Moreover, the statement cannot relate to
a collateral matter. The witness must first be given a chance to explain or reconcile
his prior statement with his present testimony. This must be accomplished by laying
a foundation, which involves presenting the witness with his prior statement and the
circumstances in which it occurred. Further, if the witness denies the prior statement,
the proponent must follow through with proof of the prior statement by extrinsic
evidence. 2 S. GARD, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL § 23:03 (2d ed. 1979).
63. The voucher rule's premise is that a party is bound by his witness' testimony because when a party calls a witness to the stand he vouches for his credibility.
Graham, supra note 5, at 352. Moreover, the rule was meant to prevent a party from
"proving the witness' prior statement in situations where it appears that its only
value to the proponent will be as substantive evidence of the facts asserted." C.
MCCORMICK,

supra note 22, § 38, at 83-84.
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rule prohibited a party from impeaching his own witness,"' but was
subject to exception. 5 One such exception was Supreme Court Rule
238. This rule allowed a party to impeach his own witness only when
the party calling the witness was surprised by his testimony.6 The
requirement of surprise was intended to disallow impeachment
which carried a high probability of being used improperly as substantive evidence. 7 Recently, however, Supreme Court Rule 238 was
amended to abolish the requirement of surprise."' This amendment
brought Rule 238 in line with Federal Rule 60769 which allows any
witness to be impeached by any party. y0 Many commentators have
urged that this amendment could only be consistent with a rule
7
which allows admission of all prior inconsistent statements. 1
Notwithstanding the limitations placed upon the use of prior
inconsistent statements, the Illinois Supreme Court had a clear opportunity to judicially abolish the orthodox rule in People v. Collins.7 2 In Collins, the state's key witness testified in favor of the defendants. The prosecution then introduced a signed prior
64. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 38, at 83-84.
65. The court's witness rule is a way around a voucher rule because instead of
having to impeach your own witness, the court will call the witness, thereby allowing
both parties an opportunity to impeach. Graham, supra note 5, at 360. Another limitation on impeachment in Illinois was the nullification rule. The nullification rule
prohibited a party from impeaching any witness if the impeaching statements related
directly to the crime charged. Id. at 358. Over time, however, the nullification rule
lost its impact. See People v. Taglia, 113 Ill. App. 3d 260, 446 N.E.2d 1276 (1983);
People v. Triplett, 87 Ill. App. 3d 763, 409 N.E.2d 401 (1980).
66. Supreme Court Rule 238 was enacted in 1967 to codify the common law
doctrine dealing with surprise testimony from one's own witness. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110A, § 238 (1967). Supreme Court Rule 238 provided that the voucher rule would be
inapplicable when the court found that the witness' testimony surprised the party
calling him. Id. Moreover, the courts required the surprised party to show that he
suffered affirmative damage besides surprise. Graham, supra note 5, at 355. Supreme
Court Rule 238, however, was limited to civil cases only. Id. at 354 n.131.
67. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 238.
68. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1l0A, § 238 (1983) (as amended April, 1982).
The amended rule provides:
(a) The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the
party calling him.
(b) If the court determines that a witness is hostile or unwilling, he may be
examined by the party calling him as if under cross-examination.
Id.
Section (a) of this rule abolishes the voucher rule so that a party may now impeach his own witness. Section (b) is continued from the old rule, and allows a party
to question his own witness by leading questions if the court determines that the
witness is hostile.
In conjunction with the 1982 amendment to rule 238, Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 433 was enacted making Rule 238 applicable to criminal as well as civil cases.
ILL. SuP. CT. R. 433. For a current application of rule 238 in a criminal case, see People v. Gonzalez, 120 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 458 N.E.2d 1047 (1983).

69.

FED.

70.
71.
72.

Id.
See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
49 11. 2d 179, 274 N.E.2d 77 (1971).

R.

EVID.

607.
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inconsistent statement of the witness which inculpated the defendants. 73 The supreme court found that the statement was erroneously admitted as substantive evidence, 74 and expressly rejected the
modern view. 7 5 Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the Collins holding.76 Because of this lack of judicial initiative the legislature drafted and passed a new rule allowing
the substantive admission of some prior inconsistent statements.
THE NEW ILLINOIS RULE

The Illinois legislature, in an attempt to aid in the truth-seeking process, 77 has abandoned the antiquated orthodox rule in favor
of substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements in certain circumstances.7 8 Chapter 38, section 115-10.1, the new legislative rule, provides:
In all criminal cases, evidence of a statement made by a witness is
not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if
(a) the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing
or trial, and
(b) the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement, and
(c) the statement(1) was made under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
(2) narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition of
which the witness had personal knowledge, and
(A) the statement is proved to have been written or
signed by the witness, or
(B) the witness acknowledged under oath the making
of the statement either in his testimony at the hearing or
trial in which the admission into evidence of the prior
73. Id. at 181, 274 N.E.2d at 80.
74. Id. at 194-95, 274 N.E.2d at 85-86.
75. Id. at 197, 274 N.E.2d at 86. The Illinois Supreme Court in Collins reversed
a lower court for admitting into evidence a witness' prior statement to a police officer
without a corresponding limiting instruction which the defendant requested. Id. The
court acknowledged that the orthodox rule has problems, but concluded that substantive admission of prior inconsistent statements would involve greater practical
problems. Id. at 198, 274 N.E.2d at 87.
76. See People v. Smith, 102 Ill. 2d 365, 466 N.E.2d 236 (1984); People v. Pastarino, 91 Ill. 2d 178, 435 N.E.2d 1144 (1982); People v. Bailey, 60 Ill. 2d 37, 322
N.E.2d 804 (1975); People v. Powell, 53 Ill. 2d 465, 292 N.E.2d 409 (1973).
77. 83rd General Assembly, SB 619 (transcript of floor debate May 25, 1983) at
87 (statement of Senator Kustra) ("By enacting this bill, Illinois would move to the
forefront of those jurisdictions which are trying to change the rules of evidence to
strengthen the truth-seeking process.").
78. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1 (Supp. 1984). See also supra note 55 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the policy considerations involved in fashioning
such a legislative rule.
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statement is being sought, or at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or
(C) the statement is proved to have been accurately
recorded by a tape recorder, videotape recording, or any
other similar electronic means of sound recording.
Nothing in this Section shall render a prior inconsistent statement inadmissible for purposes of impeachment because such statement was not recorded or otherwise fails to meet the criteria set forth
herein. 9

This rule represents a compromise between the orthodox and
modern positions.80 The rule attempts to appease critics of both positions. It satisfies modern view supporters by expanding substantive
admissibility beyond the scope of federal rule 801(d)(1)(A). At the
same time, orthodox rule supporters are mollified because the rule
adds requirements which ensure that the statement was made while
also ensuring the reliability of the statement." Because the new rule
will have a substantial impact upon the practice of criminal law in
Illinois, a detailed analysis of the rule's provisions is in order.
The Prerequisites
The first part of the Illinois rule parallels rule 801(d)(1)(A), except for two slight distinctions. First, the Illinois Rule is limited to
criminal cases, whereas the federal rule applies to both civil and
criminal cases.82 Second, substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements is defined as a hearsay exception under the Illinois
84
rule, 8 whereas it is defined as non-hearsay under the federal rule.
A statement's non-hearsay status in rule 801(d)(1)(A) is premised
79.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1 (Supp. 1984).

80. The Illinois rule is an adaptation of a rule proposed by Professor Michael
Graham. Graham, supra note 26, at 1592 n.75. Moreover, Professor Graham's article
was specifically incorporated into the legislative history of the new Illinois rule. 83rd
General Assembly, House of Representatives, (transcript of floor debate Nov. 1, 1983)
at E03 (statement of Rep. Cullerton).
81. The Illinois rule contains essentially the same provisions as Federal Rule
801(d)(1)(A), but adds new provisions which are intended to allow the substantive
admission of additional types of prior inconsistent statements. These provisions limit
those additional types of statements to those which are reliable, and almost certainly
made. Hence, the rule is not all-encompassing. It limits substantive admissibility in
response to legislative concern over the inherent unreliability of prior inconsistent
statements. Graham, supra note 26, at 1575-81.
82. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1 (Supp. 1984).
The Illinois rule seems to be aimed solely at alleviating the turncoat witness problem
in criminal cases. However, the rationale supporting substantive admissibility of prior
inconsistent statements applies equally to civil cases. In fact, of the supporters of
substantive admissibility, the only ones that distinguish between civil and criminal
cases would relax the standards in the civil area because there is no need to safeguard
an accused's rights. Graham, supra note 26, at 1581 n.45, 1589 n.68.
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1 (Supp. 1984).
84. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(A).
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upon the notion that when the witness is currently testifying in
court under oath and subject to cross-examination, 5 the underlying
rationale of the hearsay rule is satisfied. The Illinois rule, however,
creates only an exception to the hearsay rule, thereby implicitly recognizing that prior inconsistent statements do involve some hearsay
problems.8 6 Aside from these two distinctions, the Illinois rule parallels the federal rule's prerequisites that the witness' prior statement
must be "inconsistent"87 with his present testimony, and that the
witness must be "subject to" cross-examination s concerning the
statement.
As to the requirement of "inconsistency," 89 Illinois courts will
most likely define the term in the same manner it has been defined
with regard to impeachment.9 0 That definition does not require a
direct contradiction, but only a tendency to contradict the witness'
present testimony." The question that arises, however, is whether a
claim of memory loss is inconsistent with the witness' prior assertion.92 This situation can arise if the witness cannot recall the statement itself, or cannot recall having made the statement. Determina85. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 996.
86. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at 728. Some hearsay may be unreliable.
However, hearsay evidence has a wide range of reliability depending upon "the frailties of perception, memory, narration, and veracity of men and women." Id. Cf Bein,
supra note 23, at 986-89 (classification as a hearsay exception or non-hearsay depends
upon the opportunity to cross-examine).
87. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
89. As to the determination of inconsistency, Wigmore has stated that it "is to
be determined, not by individual words or phrases alone, but by the whole impression or effect of what has been said or done. On a comparison of the two utterances,
are they in effect inconsistent?" 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 1048 (emphasis in
original).
90. No distinction between inconsistency for impeachment and substantive use
has been developed in the case law. Jeans, supra note 10, at 159.
91. 2 S. GARD, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL § 23:07 (2d ed. 1979). See also People
v. Davis, 106 Ill. App. 3d 260, 263-64, 435 N.E.2d 838, 841-42 (2d Dist. 1982) (inconsistency is found if prior statement reasonably discredits the present testimony). Illinois courts have also recognized that an omission, silence, or opinion testimony could
result in an inconsistency. M. GRAHAM, CLEARY & GRAHAM'S HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS
EVIDENCE § 613.2 (4th ed. 1984).
92. Professor Wigmore believes that "where the witness now claims to be unable to recollect a matter, a former affirmation of it should be admitted as a contradiction." 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 1059 (emphasis in original). This view is
premised on the belief that the witness is lying about his loss of memory, hence a
false assertion about forgetfulness is inconsistent with a prior statement. Id. at 1061.
Some authorities dispute the basic premise that "inconsistency" should even be
considered with respect to substantive admissibility. These scholars believe that the
requirement of inconsistency is only a valid consideration for impeachment purposes,
not for substantive admissibility. This view is premised on the idea that the inconsistency requirement prevents the use of "those prior statements that are particularly
likely to be erroneously considered by the jury for their substantive worth despite
limiting instructions." Bein, supra note 23, at 1016-17. See also Jeans, supra note 10,
at 160.
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tion of this issue under the Illinois rule should be left to the
discretion of the trial judge,9" thereby following the apparent federal
interpretation. 4
The final prerequisite is that the witness be subject to crossexamination. Cross-examination has been termed "the greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."" That phrase underscores the importance of a cross-examination requirement in any
rule governing substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements.9 " The phrase "subject to" cross-examination, however, is ambiguous.9 7 It could be interpreted to mean that the witness need
only be in court. That conclusion, however, would seem incongruous
if the witness denies making the statement or alleges that he cannot
recall the content of the statement" because under those circumstances any ensuing cross-examination would be worthless."
Scholars are split as to whether a prior statement should be admissible when the witness is forgetful. 100 As to the Illinois rule, however, the legislative history seems to settle the point. Both Representative McCracken and Governor Thompson stated that even
when "the witness . . . claim[s] that he or she does not recall it, the
prior statement would be admissible substantively for the fact find93. There seems to be general agreement that the trial judge should have broad
discretion to determine the inconsistency question. See United States v. Thompson,
708 F.2d 1294, 1302 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 795-96
(8th Cir. 1980); 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 1061; Perroni, Impeachment of
One's Own Witness by PriorInconsistent Statements Under the Federaland Arkansas Rules of Evidence, 1 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 277, 289 (1978).
94. Compare United States v. Thompson, 708 F.2d 1294, 1302 (8th Cir. 1983)
(witness' insistence that he could not recall is inconsistent with earlier statement)
and United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d 954, 958 (6th Cir. 1981) ("partial or vague
recollection is inconsistent with total or definite recollection") with United States v.
Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123, 128 n.6 (3d Cir. 1981)(lack of recollection not necessarily
inconsistent with prior statement).
95. 5 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (Chadbourn rev.
1974).
96. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 969. See also Stalmack, supra note 2, at

259-64 (stressing the importance of cross-examination).
97. Stalmack, supra note 2, at 262-63.
98. Peeples, supra note 2, at 1391. See infra note 103 for a definition of a forgetful witness.
99. Id. See also Reutlinger, supra note 14, at 374. If the witness denies having
made the statement, the cross-examiner cannot even get the witness to admit any
error. Id. at 372.
100. Most commentators distinguish between honest memory loss and feigned
memory loss. Whenever memory loss is feigned, effective cross-examination can occur
and the statement should be admitted as evidence. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at
748; Peeples, supra note 2, at 1392-93. However, at least one author claims that this

distinction is groundless, and that the better view would be to look at the circumstances surrounding the witness' testimony and determine whether effective crossexamination could occur without regard to whether the memory loss was honest or
feigned. Bein, supra note 23, at 1020-23.
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ers [sic] consideration."' 101 It would be unfortunate if the Illinois
courts follow this broad interpretation of when a witness is availa-

ble, especially if the witness is not feigning memory loss, 02 because
a truly forgetful witness cannot be subject to effective cross-examination. 0 3 The better treatment would be to give the trial judge
broad discretion in determining
whether meaningful cross-examina04
tion can take place.

Once the proponent of the prior statement has satisfied the prerequisites of "inconsistency" and "cross-examination," he has two
alternative methods from which to choose in order to satisfy the requirements of the rule.' 05 He may choose either section c(1) 06 or
7
10
section c(2).

Alternative c(1)-Made in a Judicial Setting
Section c(1) allows a prior inconsistent statement to be admitted as probative evidence if it "was made under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding. 08 This section is substantially similar to
rule 801(d)(1)(A), except that the federal rule also allows the admission of a prior inconsistent statement which was made in a deposition.' 0 9 The Illinois provision does not include a reference to a deposition because it is limited to criminal cases where discovery
101. 83rd General Assembly, House of Representatives, (transcript of floor debate Nov. 1, 1983) at B03 (statement of Rep. McCracken). Accord Governor's
Amendatory Veto Message of SB 619, 1983 Ill. Laws 6475.
102. See supra note 92. A witness could be feigning memory loss for any number of reasons. He may have been coerced, persuaded, or may have merely decided
that he does not want to hurt the defendant. If the witness has honestly forgotten,
however, then any cross-examination to occur would be ineffective since the witness
could not even attempt to explain the prior statement.
103. As used here, a truly forgetful witness is one who denies having made the
statement and claims lack of memory regarding the underlying act. In this situation,
the witness would not be "subject to" cross-examination. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 42, at 801-131 to 801-132. Moreover, this situation would be of questionable constitutional validity. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 168-69 (1970) (this
specific issue left open by the Court). For a discussion of the sixth amendment
problems in conjunction with prior inconsistent statements, see Graham, The Confrontation Clause, The HearsayRule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEX. L. REV.151
(1978).
If the witness acknowledges having made the statement but claims loss of memory as to the underlying fact, then effective cross-examination can probably occur. 4
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 42, at 801-120.
104. The trial judge will be in the best position to observe the witness and determine whether subsequent cross-examination would be fruitful. See 5 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 95, at 57.
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1 (Supp. 1984).
106. See infra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
107.
108.
109.

See infra notes 116-35 and accompanying text.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1 (Supp. 1984).
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). See also supra note 15 (text of federal rule).
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depositions are not used. 1

°

It is clear under section c(1) that if the prior inconsistent statement was made at a previous trial or hearing, it will be admitted.
The question that arises, however, is in regard to the parameters of
the term "other proceeding." The Illinois courts will most likely interpret that phrase as it has been used in the federal courts. The
federal interpretation of "other proceeding" includes grand jury proceedings, 1 ' preliminary hearings," 2 and immigration interrogations." '3 Many scholars, however, have urged that the term "other
proceeding" should include administrative proceedings, coroner's inquests, and any proceeding that is substantially similar to those already listed." 4 Illinois courts should adopt this broad interpretation
of "other proceeding" to ensure an expansive reading of the statute
so that the truth can be ascertained. However, even if the prior
statement was not made at a previous trial, hearing or other proceeding, it may still be admissible under section c(2) of the Illinois
rule." 5'
Alternative c(2)-Personal Knowledge
Section c(2) was enacted for reasons that are twofold. First, in
response to criticism that Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A) is too restrictive, section c(2) attempts to broaden the types of inconsistent
statements that are admissible." 6 Second, to appease advocates of
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1 (Supp. 1984); ILL. SuP. CT. R. 212. Illinois
does provide for the use of evidence depositions which can be used in criminal cases.
Use of an evidence deposition is predicated on court approval, and admissibility of
the deposition depends upon the unavailability of the deponent. If the deponent is
available and his present testimony is inconsistent with his deposition, the prior
statement can be used to impeach his credibility. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 212 & 414. However,
because the Illinois rule on prior inconsistent statements does not include a reference
to depositions, statements contained in evidence depositions cannot be used
substantively.
111. See United States v. Hemmer, 729 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1984); United
States v. Russell, 712 F.2d 1256, 1258 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); United States v.
Murphy, 696 F.2d 282, 284 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); United
States v. Woods, 613 F.2d 629, 636 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 920 (1980);
United States v. Morgan, 555 F.2d 238, 242 (9th Cir. 1977).
112. Graham, supra note 26, at 1578 n.40 (noting that preliminary hearing or
grand jury testimony would be admissible in criminal cases).
113. United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 983 (1976).
114. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 42, at 801-111 ("should be
broadly interpreted to include situations where there is some kind of judicial or
quasi-judicial proceeding"); Graham, supra note 26, at 1579 n.44 (advocates broad
interpretation of the term "other proceeding"); Steigmann, Prior Inconsistent Statements as Substantive Evidence in Illinois, 72 ILL. B. J. 638, 640 (1984) (both coroner's inquests and administrative hearings clearly within the rule).
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1(c)(2) (Supp. 1984).
116. The Illinois rule expands the substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements beyond those that were made in a formal proceeding.
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the orthodox rule, section c(2) attempts to limit admissibility to
statements that were almost certainly made' 17 and have a strong indicia of reliability."
In order to enhance the reliability of statements deemed admissible, section c(2) requires that the witness' statement must relate to
circumstances the subject matter of which is within that witness'
personal knowledge." 9 To be within the personal knowledge of a
witness, the witness must have observed,' 20 and not merely have
heard, the subject matter underlying the statement.'2 ' This requirement increases reliability because it excludes those statements usually termed "double hearsay,"'12 2 unless the witness also had personal knowledge of the event underlying what was overheard. 123
The requirements of section c(2) do not end with a mere showing of personal knowledge. The section adds three additional requirements, any one of which must be met to make a statement admissible. 2 4" These subsections ensure that no unacknowledged oral
statements will be admitted. 25 Moreover, these subsections almost
117. The rule incorporates requirements of proof so that the proponent must
show that it is more probable than not that the statement was made. Graham, supra
note 26, at 1590. These requirements were drawn in response to legislative concern, at
least in Congress, that fabricated statements might be used by unscrupulous attorneys or investigators. Id. at 1582. See also New Jersey Developments, supra note 1, at
793 (New Jersey rule has similar provisions).
118. The requirement of personal knowledge contained in section c(2) of the
Illinois rule is intended to increase the reliability of the statement. This is said to
occur because a witness with personal knowledge of the event can be effectively crossexamined as to the statement so that the truth can be ascertained. Graham, supra
note 26, at 1584.
119. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1(c)(2) (Supp. 1984).
120. Steigman, supra note 114, at 640.
121. An example would more clearly demonstrate the personal knowledge requirement. Assume that X gives a statement, implicating Y, to the police and it is
tape recorded. Later, at trial X testifies inconsistently with his previous statement.
Situation 1: X, while at home, looked through the window, saw Y shoot someone,
and also heard Y say, just before he fired, "You shouldn't have double crossed me."
The personal knowledge requirement has been satisfied, and X's prior statement, as
to what he saw and heard, is admissible as substantive evidence.
Situation 2: X, while at home, heard someone say, "You shouldn't have double
crossed me," heard a shot fired, and a few minutes later saw Y run by the window
with a gun in his hand. In this situation X has no personal knowledge because he did
not observe the underlying event. Therefore, his prior inconsistent statement would
not be admitted, unless it was to show that he saw Y carrying a gun.
122. Graham, supra note 26, at 1586-88. See also FED. R. EvID. 805.
123. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 602 covers the requirement of
personal knowledge. The advisory comment to that rule, however, renders it inapplicable to rules 801 and 805. Hence, under rule 801(d)(1)(A), the declarant need only
have personal knowledge of the making of the statement, and not the underlying subject matter. FED. R. EvID. 602 and 801(d)(1)(A).
124. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1(c)(2)(A), (B) and (C) (Supp. 1984).
125. An unacknowledged oral statement will not satisfy any of the requirements
to the Illinois rule, and is considered too unreliable to be admitted as substantive
evidence.
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guarantee that the statements were made.12
Recordation or Acknowledgement
Subsections c(2)(A) and c(2)(C) both require proof of recordation. 2 7 The statement must have either been written or signed,12 or
accurately recorded on an electronic means of sound recording. 29
Both requirements are meant to ensure that the statement was actually made. In furtherance of that goal, these subsections require the
proponent of the statement to "prove" that it was either written,
signed or electronically recorded. This proof must be accomplished
by a preponderance of the evidence.8 0 Moreover, subsection c(2)(A)
requires the proponent to prove, again by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the alleged inconsistent statement of the declarant is
exactly the same as the statement contained in the writing.'
Subsection c(2)(B) s2 is the final alternative for section c(2) admissibility. If, while the witness is on the stand during trial, he acknowledges having made the statement, 3 ' or had already acknowledged making the statement during a previous trial, hearing or other
proceeding,' 8 4 the statement will be admitted substantively.'35 The
reason for this provision is that a statement which is acknowledged
by the witness himself guarantees that it was made.
In Illinois, therefore, a prior inconsistent statement that meets
the provisions of the new statute is admissible as substantive evi126. See supra note 117.
127. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1(c)(2)(A), (C) (Supp. 1984).
128. Subsection (c)(2)(A) requires that the statement was either written or
signed by the witness. Hence, this subsection would not be fulfilled by a written document prepared by another and not signed by the witness. It is questionable, however,
whether an individual's signature should even be considered to guarantee reliability
or trustworthiness. New Jersey Developments, supra note 1, at 792.
129. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1(c)(2)(C) (Supp. 1984). As to other uses of
recording devices in and out of court, see generally Comment, Judicial Administration-Technological Advances-Use of Videotape in the Courtroom and the Stationhouse, 20 DEPAUL L. REV. 924 (1971); Comment, Role of Videotape in Criminal
Courts, 10 SUFFOLK UL. REV. 1107 (1976).
130. Graham, supra note 26, at 1590-91. Professor Graham alleges that requiring the proponent to prove that the statement was made, is reasonable because the
witness is already in court and testifying under oath, which raises a presumption of
validity to the witness' in-court testimony. Id. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 903 (authentication).
131. Graham, supra note 26, at 1591. The proponent need only prove "exactness" as to that part of the writing that he seeks to use subtantively. Id.
132. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1(c)(2)(B) (Supp. 1984) (acknowledgement).
133. The acknowledgement need only refer to the making of the statement and
not to the truth of the statement itself. Id.
134. If the witness acknowledged making the statement at a previous judicial
proceeding, then subsection (c)(2)(B) would be satisfied even if the witness presently
denies that fact or denies the truth of the statement. Graham, supra note 26, at 1590.
135. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1(c)(2)(B) (Supp. 1984). The statement
must also meet the personal knowledge, cross-examination and inconsistency requirements to be admissible.
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dence. There is no doubt that the Illinois rule is an improvement
over the restrictive orthodox rule, and it also seems to be better
than rule 801(d)(1)(A). 13 6 The Illinois rule does not arbitrarily limit
admissibility to those statements made in a judicial proceeding, but
extends admissibility to various other situations. This extension
helps place more evidence before the trier of fact, which aids in the
truth seeking process. The only question that remains is whether
this new rule is the best method of dealing with substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements.
DID THE LEGISLATURE

Go

FAR ENOUGH?

The debate between advocates of the orthodox rule' 37 and supporters of the modern view"3 8 centers around the reliability of prior
inconsistent statements."3 9 The Illinois legislature has decided that
prior inconsistent statements should only be admitted substantively
in certain limited situations. Inherent in that position is the idea
that prior inconsistent statements possess hearsay characteristics
which render the statements largely unreliable so that their use
must be limited to predetermined categories. " Most of the jurisdictions that have adopted provisions for substantive use of prior inconsistent statements share this view."' If, however, the basic goal
of a criminal trial is to ascertain the truth, there is no legitimate
reason to exclude any probative evidence unless it is too prejudicial
to the opponent.
The rationale in support of the modern view is that in-court
cross-examination of a witness under oath, obviates most, if not all,
of the hearsay dangers associated with prior inconsistent statements. 42 Placing arbitrary limits on the use of those statements,
however, belittles the modern view's rationale. The Illinois rule, although more expansive than rule 801(d)(1)(A), still places arbitrary
limitations upon the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements. Moreover, the Illinois rule is still subject to most of the criticisms that have been levied against the federal rule.
Criticisms of the Illinois Rule
One such criticism is that a prior unrecorded oral statement is
136.

FED.

R.

EVID.

801(d)(1)(A).

137. See supra notes 4-6, 22-33 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
141. The only jurisdictions that do not place severe limitations on the use of
prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence are collected in supra note 7.
142. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 969; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at 745.
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still'inadmissible.M This would be so even if the same statement
had been made by five different witnesses who have all "turned
coat.""' The same would be true if a number of people all "overheard" the same statement but had no personal knowledge
thereof.145 When overwhelming corroboration such as this is evident,
there is no justifiable reason to exclude the prior statement.""
Another criticism concerns the trier of fact's inability to comprehend tendered jury instructions."" One of the most cogent arguments against the orthodox rule is that when a jury is instructed not
to give substantive effect to a prior inconsistent statement admitted
for impeachment purposes only, the jury would not understand such
verbal "gymnastics" and would attach substantive weight to the
statement anyway. 14 Under the Illinois rule, a jury could face an
even more perplexing problem.'" It is quite likely that, of two prior
inconsistent statements presented at trial, only one will meet the
rule's criteria for substantive admissibility, while the other is relegated to impeachment use. 1 0 In such a situation, the jury will be
instructed to give substantive effect to one statement and not the
other. If jury confusion under the orthodox rule was a source of discontent to scholars, the confusion that may develop under the Illinois rule should be a cause of even greater concern. 5'
When the federal rules were adopted, many scholars pointed
out the incongruity between Federal Rules 801(d)(1)(A) and 607, regarding when impeachment evidence by prior inconsistent state143. Many would not call this a criticism, but if the ultimate goal in a criminal
trial is the determination of the truth then even unacknowledged oral statements that

are subject to cross-examination should be admitted.
144. A claim of unreliability could scarcely be made if a number of witnesses
had all made the same or similar statements but then all changed their story. One
commentator has suggested that corroboration can easily be applied in this situation.
Stalmack, supra note 2, at 268. Corroboration should not, however, be applied to the
question of admissibility, instead all prior inconsistent statements made by a witness
subject to cross-examination should be admitted and the trial court should then look
to the corroborating evidence in determining sufficiency. Id. at 269.
145. This situation, just as the situation in note 144 supra, shows how the personal knowledge requirement places an undue restriction on substantive
admissibility.
146. Stalmack, supra note 2, at 268-69.
147. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
148. See 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 1007 and C. MCCORMICK, supra note
22, at 746, and authorities cited therein.
149. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1 (Supp. 1984).
150. The provisions of the Illinois rule make this result likely. If one of the
prior inconsistent statements was in writing while the other was verbal and unacknowledged, only the written one will be admitted substantively.
151. It is much more difficult for a jury to distinguish between treating one
inconsistent statement substantively and treating the other for impeachment purposes, than it is for them to treat all inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes. This is because the dual treatment is illogical. See Stalmack, supra note 2, at
273.
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ment may be used substantively." 2 The problem arose as a result of
a congressional compromise which predated the adoption of rule
801(d)(1)(A). Since then, commentators have urged that one of two
solutions be implemented to alleviate the problem. 5 One solution
would be to amend rule 607, and reinsert the requirements of surprise and affirmative damage. 54 The better solution, however, would
be to amend rule 801(d)(1)(A) to allow substantive admissibility of
almost all prior inconsistent statements.' 55
With the recent amendment to Illinois Supreme Court Rule
238,156 which eliminated the surprise requirement, Illinois is faced
with the same incongruous situation. The remedy is to either
reamend Supreme Court Rule 238, or amend the new rule on sub57
stantive admissibility, to admit all prior inconsistent statements.1
A

PROPOSAL

As already noted, the best device to counteract any hearsay
danger is effective cross-examination. 5 The trier of fact should
have an opportunity to view not only the witness' present testimony
but also the witness' current reaction to statements previously
made. From this observation, the trier of fact can better discern the
truth. Hence, any prior inconsistent statement should be admitted if
the witness can be subject to effective cross-examination. 59 With
that proposition in mind, this comment proposes the following
152. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 26, at 1567; Ordover, supra note 11, at 69.
153. This problem arose because rule 607 was proposed to complement an earlier version of federal rule 801(d)(1)(A) which would have admitted almost all prior
inconsistent statements. If all prior inconsistent statements are admissible substantively then no jury confusion could ever result. When rule 801(d)(1)(A) was actually
adopted, in its narrowed form, many commentators urged that rule 607 was inconsistent because rule 801(d)(1)(A) no longer allowed for the admission of all prior inconsistent statements. Hence, by allowing any party to impeach his own witness, the
chance that a jury will use the evidence substantively will still exist; the exact result
that the original proposals sought to alleviate. For a discussion of the circumstances
surrounding the adoption of rule 801(d)(1)(A), see Graham, supra note 26, at 157582; Ordover, supra note 11, at 65-66; Stalmack, supra note 2, at 252-54; Comment,
Symposium on the FederalRules of Evidence: Their Effect on Wyoming Practice if
Adopted, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 601, 652-55 (1977).
154. Surprise and affirmative damage were required to be shown before allowing
a party to impeach his own witness. This requirement was thought to eliminate impeachment by those prior inconsistent statements to which the jury would most likely
impart substantive value. Graham, supra note 26, at 1612. The abolishment of the
"surprise" requirement in rule 607 was predicated upon "the supposition that all
prior inconsistent statements would be substantively admissible." Id. at 1612-13.
However, the congressional compromise which resulted in rule 801(d)(1)(A) upset the
underlying rationale of rule 607. Id.
155. Stalmack, supra note 2, at 271-73.
156. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 238.
157. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 7 and 11.

1985]

PriorInconsistent Statements

amendment to replace section 115-10.1:160
Admissibility of Prior Inconsistent Statements. Unless justice requires otherwise, in all criminal161 cases, evidence of a statement made
by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if
(a) the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing
or trial, and
(b) the witness is subject to effective cross-examination concerning the statement.
Under this proposal, almost all prior inconsistent statements
will be substantively admissible. The requirement of inconsistency
under section (a) should be interpreted broadly so that a tendency
to contradict would be sufficient. 162 Section (b) requires that effective cross-examination be available. The trial judge should be given
discretion in deciding whether the witness will be subject to "effective cross-examination," thereby eliminating any hearsay problems.
Insertion of the word "effective" should be interpreted to exclude
prior statements which the witness does not recall making, unless
the trial judge is satisfied that the witness is feigning loss of memory 163 or is otherwise satisfied that effective examination can take
place.164 Aside from the requirements of inconsistency and effective
cross-examination, this proposal adds the phrase "unless justice requires otherwise" as a prerequisite to admissibility. This phrase
gives the trial judge broad discretion to determine when to exclude a
statement because it is too prejudicial or unreliable.165
This proposal is intended to advance the idea, succinctly stated
by Weinstein, that a "jury is more apt to arrive at a sound factual
determination if it is given as much available data as possible, in'
cluding evidence of what a key witness said on prior occasions." 166
Moreover, this proposal alleviates the three criticisms that have
been levied against both the federal and Illinois rules. First, unre160. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10.1 (Supp. 1984).
161. This proposal is limited to criminal cases because the Illinois legislature
does not seem disposed to apply a rule on substantive admissibility to civil cases. See
supra note 82.
162. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
165. The trial judge, being in the best position to observe the witness and the
circumstances surrounding the attempted introduction of the prior inconsistent statement, should have broad discretion so that he could exclude a statement for being
either more prejudicial than probative, irrelevant or untrustworthy. Cf. CALIF. EvID.
CODE § 1235 (1966).
166. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 42, at 801-124 n.4. "Moreover,
the witness who has told one story aforetime and another today has opened the gates
to all vistas of truth which the common law practice of cross-examination and reexamination was invented to explore." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at 746. Hence,
there is no reason to exclude any evidence from the trier of fact, which can be effectively cross-examined.
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corded oral statements will be substantively admissible unless overly
prejudicial.16 7 Second, confusion over jury instructions is practically
eliminated."1 8 Finally, this proposal is consistent with Supreme
Court Rule 238.169 In this way, rather than specifying predetermined
categories, many prior inconsistent statements otherwise inadmissible under the Illinois rule, will be admitted unless clearly
prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
The Illinois legislature should be commended for taking the
first step to modernize at least one evidentiary rule. 70 The new Illinois rule is both an improvement over the previously followed orthodox rule, and goes a step beyond Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A). However, the rule still unnecessarily limits the types of statements
admissible as substantive evidence. Illinois courts can minimize the
limitations within the new rule by broadly interpreting its provisions. However, in order to completely remedy the situation and to
reinforce the idea that the search for truth should be the paramount
goal in a criminal case, the legislature should amend the rule to allow for substantive admissibility of all prior inconsistent statements
that are not overly prejudicial. An amendment of this type should,
once and for all, eliminate the ill effects of the "turncoat" witness in
Illinois.
Mark D. Krauskopf

167. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text. Under this proposal, any
prior statement is admissible if it is inconsistent and the witness will be subject to
effective cross-examination. However, the trial judge could exclude an unrecorded
oral statement if the circumstances indicate that the prior statement is clearly
unreliable.
168. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text. Because almost all prior
inconsistent statements will be admissible as substantive evidence, it is unlikely that
a jury would have to distinguish between prior inconsistent statements to be used to
discredit, and those admitted as evidence.
169. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text. Because almost all prior
inconsistent statements will be admitted substantively, the former "surprise" requirement of Supreme Court Rule 238 would not be needed. There would no longer be any
reason to fear that the jury will improperly impart substantive value to the statements, because these prior inconsistent statements would now properly be admitted
as substantive evidence.
170. Illinois has yet to adopt an independent code containing rules of evidence,
although the idea has been explored. See Graham, supra note 5. Instead, the legislature seems to act only when the judicially created rules of evidence are adverse to
their desires.

